Social networks have been growing and evolving from mere means of communication into the biggest potential global market and access platform to hundreds of millions of customers ever built. However, although companies and organisations can have access to millions of potential customers almost in an instant, being able to identify the best initial entry points for introducing innovation (be it a service or product) is key to aiding its acceptance and enhancing its prospects of further diffusion into the market. In this paper, by using the economic model of return to scale, we investigate a mechanism for identifying these potential best initial entry points for introducing innovation in social networks in terms of its efficiency and a cost-benefits analysis. We present a set of experiments based on two real social network datasets and also a synthetic one that shows the effects of deploying our mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Social networks have rapidly grown to become the largest potential market ever to have emerged. Hundreds of millions of people worldwide are seen as potential customers by firms. However, although firms can have access to growing numbers of customers through social networks, new challenges have emerged as being able to identify the best initial entry points for introducing innovation (be it a service or product) is a key issue. Traditional approaches to introducing innovation are no longer applicable, since the nature and dynamics of such networks require more sophisticated solutions.
Although there exist different market techniques and models that help shed light on the process of introducing innovation, the majority of them are mostly ad-hoc solutions that may apply only to particular types of products or specific markets. Most opinions on this topic agree on the two main characteristics that most significantly affect an innovation's success: adoption and diffusion. Seminal works by [1] and [2] have progressed on the field, but they are oriented towards traditional markets. Moreover, the focus of these works is on what happens once innovation is introduced into the market, but not before, since they do not examine what could be the best entry points to initiate product adoption and diffusion or how a firm would be able to identify these in the first place and/or choose among them. So although there is increasing interest in social networks, work on innovation seeding in such networks has been limited.
The linear threshold model proposed by [3] postulates the existence of a subset of individuals in a network -the seed set -who have already adopted the innovation. The other members of the social network subsequently adopt the innovation if the fraction of their neighbours that have already adopted it is above a certain threshold (which may differ for individuals). However, how this initial seed set is identified is not determined. One trend in research on diffusion is to investigate when innovations become persistent in the population. For example, [4] presents a method to find the threshold for the spreading rate above which a behaviour spreads and becomes persistent in a certain population. This work suggests that this threshold depends on the connectivity distribution of the social network. Similarly, [5] is focused on threshold models of collective behaviour which explain how users can eventually have different rates of adoption. Accordingly, there exist two levels of innovation rates for a user: one macro, relative to the system, and one micro, relative to her personal network. In [6] , the authors conclude that there exist some influential nodes that foster diffusion of innovation throughout the network. They present different probabilistic models that allow estimating the node activation from the signals received by other users. [7] show that influential individuals tend not to be susceptible to influence from others, while susceptible individuals tend not to be influential. Another relevant approach is that of [8] , in which the author explains how the formation of the network affects the diffusion process of the innovations.
Other works have studied the effect of clustering on innovation diffusion such as on complex contagions (where individuals have high thresholds) and epidemics (where individuals have low thresholds) [9] . [10] introduces an extension to the notion of cohesiveness and characterise the final set of adopters. In their experimental work, the authors assume that the individuals in the initial seed set are uniformly distributed over the network. They then show that highly clustered networks may not necessarily be more advantageous over less structured networks that contain large numbers of random links. If there exists an initial seed node within a cluster, this promotes diffusion, but if there is no such initial seed node, then it is not as easy to penetrate the cluster. In [11] , the authors present an algorithm which provides a constant factor approximation to the optimal adaptive policy for any influence function in the triggering model.
Our work is different in that we focus on identifying the initial seed set: the most appropriate entry points to initiate the 978-1-4673-9669-1/15/31.00 c 2015 IEEE Abstractinnovation adoption and diffusion. To this end, we mine the underlying structure of the network and utilise characteristics of individual nodes such as influencing power to determine the most promising entry points for seeding the innovation. The aim of this paper is two-fold: i) to provide a mechanism for identifying suitable entry points for seeding innovation in social networks in order to aid its early adoption and diffusion; and, ii) to analyse the efficiency of the mechanism in terms of cost and benefits. We present a set of experiments based on two real social network datasets and a synthetic one that shows the effects of deploying the mechanism.
The proposed mechanism for identifying and choosing suitable entry points for innovation in a social network relies on the identification of well positioned users (from a structural perspective) [12] , and those that have the ability to influence others [13] in adopting an innovation. Since diffusion depends on the users' acceptance of the innovation, we focus on the innovation seeding, which is the only process that a firm has control over. We call our approach Social Innovation Seeding Mechanism (hereafter SISM). We use the following centrality measures to identify hubs: Degree that represents the number of links that a node has, Betweenness that is a measure based on how well a user is situated on the paths it lies on [14] , and PageRank that measures the importance of a node in terms of the fraction of time spent at that node relative to all other nodes in a random walk throughout the network.
II. NETWORK AND INDIVIDUAL MODELS

A. Social network model
A social network Ω can be modelled as a directed graph G Ω = (V, E), in which V corresponds to a set of users and E is a set of edges representing relationships in Ω. Let (v i , v j ) ∈ E, with v i , v j ∈ V , an edge in G Ω representing a relationship from v i to v j . These relationships might denote, for example, follower-followee relations (e.g. Twitter), friendship (e.g. Facebook), job links (e.g. LinkedIn), and so on. The neighbourhood of a user is denoted as a function neigh (v 
We assume that users can communicate if there exists a link between them, hence, if user v i wants to communicate with v j , then there must exist a link (v i , v j ) ∈ E. Users communicate via signals: a signal sent by user v i -right after adopting a certain innovation k -to another user v j is denoted by σ k vi→vj . We assume a signal σ k is broadcasted to all of a user's neighbours when adopting the innovation k. An example of this type of communication is Twitter: when users tweet messages, these are broadcasted to all their followers.
There are three types of stakeholders in our model. Users (S): are typical agents in a social network that may or may not adopt an innovation and, if so, communicate it to their neighbours. Innovation creators (IC): are agents that create innovation (i.e. firms). Network explorers (NE): are agents managed and deployed by the ICs and they are responsible for exploring the network to identify promising users through which to introduce the innovation into the network.
B. User behavioural model
Users are rational entities and when a user receives a signal about an innovation, it reasons about the presented opportunity and comes to a decision to adopt it or not. To model this, we adapt the Bass Model (BM) proposed in [1] , in which the probability of innovation adoption of a user is calculated as:
p is the coefficient of innovation (how innovative the user is), q is the coefficient of imitation (how much the user is influenced by others), N k (t) is the total number of adopters up to time t, and N is the total number of potential product buyers.
In our case, we regard users as only having a partial view of the network, i.e. they only have knowledge about their neighbours. Note that since we consider that different innovations may take place at the same time, A k denotes the probability of adopting innovation k, while N k is the number of neighbours that have already adopted the specific innovation k.
We assume that any link in the social network entails some sort of influencing power among the users. For instance, in Twitter, the action of following someone means the followed has power over the follower, the former is somehow appealing to or influential on the latter. Besides the inherent relation given by the link between two users in the social network, profiles could be utilised to obtain similarity measures among individuals since common interests usually foster the innovation adoption. In order to include similarity between users into the model, we extend equation 1 to represent the probability of adoption. Given a received signal σ k vi→· the resulting function is presented in equation 2.
is the number of neighbours that already adopted the innovation up to time t 1 . α determines the sensitivity of the user to internal forces (coefficient of innovation) versus external forces (coefficient of imitation) to adopt the innovation (parameter β). γ represents the degree of belief the user has on the importance of the similarity with its neighbours. Note that α + β + γ = 1 is a requirement. We call this the Adapted Bass Model (A-BM). Note that this function can cover different types of social networks. While in Facebook similarity can be obtained through the users' profiles, in Twitter there is no such notion of profile features (γ = 0).
We represent user profiles as an n-dimensional preference vector
, 1} denoting that the user v i presents this feature (1) or it does not (0). We calculate the similarity (sim function in eq. 2) by using the Tanimoto similarity index. This function is typically used to compare chemical molecules that can be represented with an array of binary elements in chemical processes. Since ρ vi profiles are binary arrays, this index appears to be an efficient way to calculate similarity, but other methods could be used here depending on the complexity and representation of the profile. Let . We assume that the contact between an IC and a user to introduce a certain innovation k into the network has an associated cost for the IC given by c(k)
III. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
We are interested in exploring whether SISM can help an IC identify the best entry point according to its cost-benefit. For simplicity, we only follow through and show in action one IC trying to introduce sequentially multiple innovations. In the first time step, the IC uses one (but it could be a combination) of the centrality methods to identify the candidate initial seed set with the innovation. The signalled user then decides to accept (or not) the innovation. If it accepts it (see adoption function in Eq. 2), the user will send a signal to its neighbours (considered at the next time step). If the entry point user does not accept the innovation, then the IC will offer an incentive.
The economic model used for the incentive to be paid to the initial adopters is the return to scale. Accordingly, there is a positive return to scale where there is a positive cost-benefits' non-linear relationship [15] . The incentive the IC will pay is calculated as: inc = C pos(.) where pos(.) is the user's position in the ranking of hubs, and C is a constant that may vary in different domains. We set C = 1000 for this set of experiments.
The IC selects the user according to its cost (which depends on the user's position), and its budget constraint. For example, suppose the budget constraint is 500. According to the proposed equation, the cost of the best positioned user is 1000. This is above the budget constraint, and hence, this user does not receive any incentive. The cost of the next best positioned user (2nd) is 500 which is equal to the budget constraint, and hence, this user receives the incentive. Thus, the smaller the budget, the lower the position of the user in the ranking that receives the incentive.
We have used three datasets for our experimental work: The first dataset was collected from surveying participants using a Facebook application [16] . This network contains 333 users and 5038 links among them denoting reciprocal friendships (all edges in the graph are bidirectional) comprising 'circles' (or 'friends lists'). The second dataset is based on Twitter [16] with 242 users. In such networks, there are certain sets of vertices with a degree that greatly exceeds the average (hub nodes). We have also created an artificial network of the same size as the Facebook dataset (i.e. 333 nodes) as a poorly connected network. Moreover, we use three different centrality measures: Degree, Betweeness and PageRank. We run nine treatments based on the combination of centrality measures and datasets. On every combination we tested seven different budget constraints (10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 and 1000), on ten different initial nodes. The results presented are the average of 10 runs (for each experiment) with different random seeds to set up different initial user populations (different parameters in eq. 2). We measure the cost benefits of the incentive comparing three different parameters among the budget constraints: the convergence rate, the total number of adopters and the initial number of adopters.
A. Results of evolution of the numbers of adopters 1) Facebook Dataset Results
The results shown in Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the results on the convergence rate and final numbers of adopters of the innovation with the Facebook dataset. Firstly, the convergence rate is very similar when using the Degree and PageRank centrality measures regardless of the budget constraint. Note in Figure 2 that it is not possible to identify a budget constraint level that could lead to a higher convergence rate. Secondly, even though the convergence rate for different budget constraint levels are similar when using the Degree and PageRank centrality measures, these convergence rates are higher than the case of random selection. This can be viewed clearly in Figure 1 as the curve of the random selection convergence is below every curve on the SISM Degree and PageRank centrality measures regardless of the budget constraint level. Thirdly, the convergence rate is different among the various budget levels when the Betweenness centrality measure is used as part of the SISM mechanism. Differently to SISM Degree and PageRank centrality measures, Figure 2 shows that different budget constraint levels lead to a different convergence rate when using the SISM Betweenness centrality measure. Fourthly, Figure 2 suggests that irrespective of the level of the budget constraint, the final number of adopters is very similar in the three SISM centrality measures used in this treatment. This means that it is not worth to incentivise the well connect initial adopters if the objective is only to reach as many users as possible.
2) Twitter Dataset Results
The results shown in Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the results obtained from the Twitter dataset. Firstly, similarly to the Facebook dataset, the convergence rate is very similar for the SISM Degree and PageRank centrality measures and this appears to be regardless of the budget constraint. Secondly, the convergence rate appears to differ for the various budget levels for the SISM Betweenness centrality measure. Unlike the SISM Degree and PageRank centrality measures, Figure 4 shows that different budget constraint levels lead to a different convergence rate when the SISM Betweenness centrality measure is used. Finally, Figure 4 shows that the convergence rates for all the SISM centrality measures are higher than the random selection regardless of the budget constraint levels. Figure 4 also suggests that the final number of adopters is very similar for the three SISM centrality measures used in this treatment regardless the budget constraint levels used.
3) Poor Dataset Results
As indicated earlier, in addition to conducting experiments with data from real social networks we created an artificial poorly connected network equal in size to the Facebook network. The results shown in Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the results obtained with this "Poor" dataset. The first observation is that the convergence rate is not similar for the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures and various budget constraint levels. Secondly, the convergence rate is similar for the different budget constraint levels when the SISM PageRank centrality measure is used. Unlike the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures, Figure 5 shows that with the SISM Betweenness centrality measure, the convergence rate is very similar in the presence of different budget constraint levels. Thridly, Figure 6 shows that the convergence rates of the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures are close to the random selection. In fact, at the start of the diffusion process and when the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures are used, the random selection shows a higher number of adopters; this only changes closer to the tenth tick in time. Finally, Figure 6 shows that the convergence rate of the PageRank centrality measure is higher to the random selection and this is irrespective of the budget constraint level used. Furthermore and in contrast to some of the results observed when the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures are used, the number of adopters when using the PageRank centrality measure and at about the tenth tick, is near 250, more than twice the number of adopters when using random selection. The results shown in Figure 7 suggest four insights that can be drawn about the diffusion of innovation using the SISM Degree centrality measure. Firstly, it appears that the budget constraint is positively correlated to the number of initial adopters. Secondly, lower levels of incentives result in the number of initial adopters being inferior to the random selection entry point with the Facebook dataset. As can be observed, it is only worth incentivising some initial adopters if the budget is above 50 monetary units, otherwise, it is preferable to select randomly the initial adopters. Thirdly, the results suggest that the use of incentives is not worthwhile with the Twitter dataset. When using random selection of entry points, the number of initial adopters is over 70, while even with the highest budget constraint, the number of initial adopters only reaches between 30 and 40. Finally, the return of 
B. Comparative results for initial adopters 1) Degree
2) Betweenness
Examining the results illustrated in Figure 8 , we can draw the following conclusions on using the SISM mechanism with the Betweenness centrality measure. Firstly, the budget constraint is not correlated to the number of initial adopters.
Unlike the discernible patterns that we can see in Figure 7 for the Degree centrality measure, the results illustrated in Figure 8 appear to have no specific pattern that can be easily deduced. For example, with the Twitter dataset, the number of initial adopters with the budget constraint of 25 monetary units is higher to the budget constraint of 50, 100 and 250 monetary units; but lower to the number of adopters with budget constraints of 500 and 1000 monetary units.
Secondly, similar to the diffusion of innovation with the SISM Degree centrality measure, the return of incentivising The results shown in Figure 9 provide three different insights about the diffusion of innovation with the SISM PageRank centrality measure. Firstly, the budget constraint is not correlated to the number of initial adopters. We can see that all of the datasets show similar numbers of initial adopters regardless of the level of the budget constraint. Secondly, and unlike the Betweenness centrality measure, with all three datasets of the experiment, the use of incentives results in the number of initial adopters being higher to randomly selected entry points. For example, even with the Poor dataset, the number of initial adopters based on incentives is around 100, while the number of initial adopters when randomly selecting entry points is below 20 (approximately 5x lower).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of determining the set of users to be targeted (seed set) to initiate the processes of adoption and diffusion of an innovation. In addition, we study the impact of the budget limitations and the cost to incentivise the user to adopt the innovation at the entry point. We have described the experiments conducted involving two real social network datasets and a synthetic one. Based on the results obtained, we can draw the following main conclusions: firstly, the results suggest that there is no benefit from low budget levels because this can lead to an initial set of adopters entailing a poor performance. Secondly, there is a budget point above which it is worth to incentive some initial adopters. Thirdly, the number of initial adopters is positively correlated to the budget constraint levels. Finally, the results suggest that the return to scale increases by a decreasing rate. Hence, our results have shown that using the SISM mechanism enables us to identify appropriate entry points to initiate the innovation adoption and diffusion processes.
There are several avenues for future work. Firstly, we would like to experiment with larger social network datasets. Secondly, we are interested in exploring the effects of ICs competing in the market for closely related innovations. A third direction is to study an extension of the mechanism in order to deal with dynamic social networks.
